OC Register: Farm Failures: How the Angels’ player development system broke and the plan to repair it

[AngelsWin.com]

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Note: This is the first of a three-part series examining the causes of the decline of the Angels’ farm system, and what measures they have taken to improve it.

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The painful narrative around the Angels grows each season, as two of the greatest talents the sport has ever seen watch years pass by without trips to the postseason.

While the knee-jerk explanation for the Angels’ failures is that they’ve made the wrong moves over the winter, the core issue is that they have had one of the worst farm systems in baseball for more than a decade.

It is the dilapidated foundation that causes everything on top of it to collapse.

“In today’s game, it’s very difficult to consistently put a contending product on the field without having internal talent come through the ranks,” Angels general manager Perry Minasian said. “It just is.”

Minasian’s most recent predecessors, Jerry Dipoto and Billy Eppler, were unable to sufficiently improve the farm system, leaving too many holes to try to fill from the pool of available players each winter.

As a result of the shallow farm system, each injury or disappointing performance from an Angels regular in the major leagues had the potential to be a crusher, because there was no safety net of minor league alternatives. Case in point: the Angels tried nine different third basemen to replace injured Anthony Rendon last year, and five of them were released.

When reliable major leaguers were available in trades, the Angels didn’t have enough attractive prospects to make trades.

“It doesn’t take a rocket scientist,” said Marcel Lachemann, who spent 55 years in professional baseball before resigning his role as an Angels special assistant this year. “The biggest bang for your dollar that you’re going to get in baseball is to develop your own players. There’s no doubt.”

An in-depth examination of the problem involved interviews with more than 30 players, coaches, managers, scouts and front office executives, most of whom were or still are employed by the Angels. Many of them spoke on condition of anonymity.

They collectively weaved a story of flawed draft strategies, frequent shifts in philosophy and leadership, poor compensation for those in charge and sub-standard technology.

It all began, many suggest, before Dipoto even arrived in 2011, with spending choices made by owner Arte Moreno.

“The genesis of the (player development problem) was Arte’s unwillingness to make big investments in that area,” a former Angels executive said. “As Arte starts to get more and more excited by the ideas of flashy free agent signings, from (Bartolo) Colon to (Vladimir) Guerrero and leading to everybody since, there was just a shift in spending behavior or how the money was allocated.”

Moreno, who is in the process of selling the team he’s owned since 2003, declined a request, through a team spokesman, to address his role in player development.

Moreno might be at the root of the problem, but many others along the way have taken the wrong steps – well-meaning as they might have been – to dig out of this hole.

There is finally some hope, though, because of Moreno’s recent spending increases and changes instituted by Minasian two years ago.

“I think they’re on the uptick,” said one rival scout who saw the entire Angels system in 2022. “They have every reason to be optimistic.”

They have nowhere to go but up.

In Baseball America’s preseason organizational rankings, the Angels’ farm system has ranked 29th or 30th five times in the last 10 years. From 2013-17, they were dead last four out of five years.

Since 2015, there have been just six players who made their major league debut with the Angels and accumulated a career total of 5 Wins Above Replacement with the Angels, according to Baseball-Reference.

That’s six out of 502 players who accumulated 5 WAR in that span.

No team in the majors has had fewer “homegrown” players reach even that modest level of production. By contrast, the World Series champion Houston Astros have had 12.

The Angels’ six are Trout, Ohtani, outfielder Kole Calhoun, infielder David Fletcher and pitchers Patrick Sandoval and Jaime Barria. The Angels signed Ohtani and Barria on the international market and traded for Sandoval as a minor leaguer.

The other three came from the draft, which has been particularly unproductive for the Angels ever since they struck gold with Trout in 2009.

In the 13 drafts since 2010, the Angels have selected and signed 317 players whose combined WAR is 62.8. That’s the third lowest in the majors in that span. The Astros lead the majors with 194.5 WAR.

In February 2016, noted baseball analyst Keith Law wrote that the Angels’ system was “the worst I’ve ever seen.”

ADIOS TO LATIN AMERICA

When the Angels were successful in the first decade of the 21st century, they had a pipeline of talent coming from Latin America. The Angels had produced players like right-hander Ramon Ortiz (signed in 1995), right-hander Ervin Santana (2000), shortstop Erick Aybar (2002) and first baseman Kendrys Morales (2005).

Within a few years of the Morales signing, the Angels practically vanished from the region, which multiple sources said was primarily because Moreno chose not to invest in that area. The Angels didn’t spend on bonuses for the players, or on the scouting and infrastructure to find them.

Further damaging their Latin American efforts, in 2009 the Angels fired international scouting director Clay Daniel after a Major League Baseball investigation into improprieties in the signing of prospects in Venezuela. There were allegations that scouts had skimmed bonus money intended for players, and that other players had falsified their ages in order to sign professional contracts.

When Dipoto took over as general manager in 2011, the Angels had just one full-time scout in the Dominican Republic and one in Venezuela.

The result of that absence? From 2006 to 2012, the Angels did not sign a single international amateur who produced at least 1 WAR for the Angels. The only impactful player they signed in that time was Dominican infielder Jean Segura, who was traded after one game with the Angels in 2012.

On Opening Day 2022, more than 28% of major leaguers were born outside the United States, representing a huge market that went essentially untapped by the Angels for years.

Although the Angels began rebuilding their international presence under Dipoto – Barria was signed out of Panama in 2013 and lefty José Suarez out of Venezuela in 2014 – they still had a lot of catching up to do.

In November 2014, Dipoto finally convinced Moreno to take the plunge. The Angels inked 20-year-old Cuban shortstop Roberto Baldoquin to an $8 million deal.

Because the Angels more than doubled their international spending limit, they also paid penalties that increased the outlay for Baldoquin to about $15 million. The penalties included limiting the Angels to $300,000 for any player over the next two years. That eliminated them from a chance at top amateurs such as Vladimir Guerrero Jr., Fernando Tatis Jr. and Juan Soto.

Baldoquin never made it past Double-A and he was released in 2020.

That flop certainly didn’t help to open Moreno’s wallet to more big-ticket expenditures in Latin America, but Dipoto and Eppler were able to convince him to continue making smaller increases in spending, sources said.

A rules change also helped. Starting in 2017, a hard cap on international bonuses was instituted, so every team could spend around $5 million per year. Teams could no longer win internationally simply by writing the biggest checks.

DRAFT FAILURES

While Moreno’s lack of financial support led to the decline internationally, he placed no such restrictions that could explain the Angels’ failures with domestic talent in the draft.

Eddie Bane, the Angels’ scouting director from 2004 to 2010, showed a preference for high-risk, high-reward selections out of high school. Bane famously coordinated one of the most successful drafts in baseball history in 2009, when he hit on five of his first six picks: outfielders Trout and Randall Grichuk and pitchers Tyler Skaggs, Garrett Richards and Patrick Corbin. All but Richards were high schoolers.

A year after that draft, Bane was fired, which he said in a 2011 interview was because of a personality clash with former GM Tony Reagins.

Bane and his successor, Ric Wilson, also had to deal with the disadvantages of the Angels’ success in the big leagues. The draft goes in reverse order of the standings, so when the Angels were annually a playoff team, they picked late in the draft. From 2005 to 2016, the Angels did not have a single pick better than No. 15 overall.

In 2007, 2012 and 2013, the Angels didn’t pick at all in the first round. In 2012, they didn’t have a second-round pick either. Those picks were surrendered in exchange for signing free agents Gary Matthews Jr., Albert Pujols, C.J. Wilson and Josh Hamilton.

With a “win now” team, Dipoto and Ric Wilson filled out their selections with what they believed were polished college players who could get to the big leagues faster, even if they lacked the upside to make them impact players.

Dipoto called them “high floor” players. It was the opposite of Bane’s approach of gambling on a “high ceiling.” In Dipoto’s four drafts, from 2012-15, the Angels took only four high school players in the top 10 rounds.

“It was pretty clear it was very college-oriented,” one former Angels scout said. “I had no chance of getting a high school player.”

The players coming out of those drafts fit a certain mold, according to former Angels minor league manager Denny Hocking. He ran the Angels’ Rookie League affiliate in Arizona in 2013 and Class-A Inland Empire in 2014 and 2015.

“You’re sitting in the dugout and a guy walks up and he’s 6-4, 230 and somebody on the bench goes ‘Oh, this is their third-rounder’ or ‘This is their fifth-rounder,’” Hocking said. “Then you say ‘Who was our fifth-rounder?’ And it’s this guy who’s 5-10, 165 pounds.”

Only four of the Angels’ draft picks from 2012-15 produced even 1 WAR for the Angels: outfielder Taylor Ward, first baseman Jared Walsh, right-hander Keynan Middleton and Fletcher.

Dipoto acknowledges that he was focused on more short-term help for the major league team, but the plan was to also draft and develop young players. As the Seattle Mariners general manager, he has built a strong farm system.

“If you’re running a high-floor, build-around-the-major-league-core model, you’ve got to be able to build in the back room and start to develop the next wave,” Dipoto said. “Unfortunately, I wasn’t able to do that when I was in Anaheim. I just failed. (With the Mariners) we’ve been more successful.”

After Eppler was hired in October 2015, he dramatically reversed the Angels’ course on the draft, going heavily toward younger players with tools and high ceilings. Eppler said it was not a premeditated strategy.

“It’s just a circumstance of who’s on the board, how your scouting group sees it, and how your whole room puts that together,” Eppler said.

Under Eppler, the Angels changed the way they scouted, relying more on analytics to make their decisions. They measured players’ raw tools with things like force plates, which quantify leg strength and agility.

Eppler and scouting director Matt Swanson took high school players with most of their top picks. In the first four rounds of the draft, from 2016-19, the Angels picked high school outfielders Jo Adell, Brandon Marsh and Jordyn Adams, shortstops Jeremiah Jackson and Kyren Paris and right-hander Chris Rodriguez.

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Adell and Marsh have since graduated to the major leagues. Adell continues to struggle. Marsh was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies in August for catcher Logan O’Hoppe, who is now the Angels’ No. 1 prospect. Rodriguez has shown promise, but he’s been injured for most of his career. The other players are still working their way up, lightly regarded by prospect analysts.

In retrospect, Eppler’s best draft pick with the Angels might have been his final first-rounder. The Angels took college left-hander Reid Detmers in 2020, and he was in the big leagues a year later. He had a breakthrough in 2022, including a no-hitter, and is set for the rotation in 2023.

Most of Eppler’s top picks were raw high school players, which a second scout said left the system with too much risk.

“They’re looking at the athlete and not really seeing the baseball player,” said the scout, who has seen the entire organization for a few years. “You need those guys, but if you’re reaching every time hoping the guy turns into something, it’s tough.”

Of course, the player’s tools are only part of the equation.

“I think a lot of the problem is just lack of talent, but a lot of times I find myself saying what are they doing with this guy?” the scout said. “I’m not saying I’m the end-all and be-all, but I think there are some pretty obvious things with certain guys that need to be addressed. …

“The main problem is talent, but they could get more out of the guys they have.”

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Next: Just as they did in the way they have drafted, the Angels have made a couple of dramatic shifts in the way they have developed players. Although many of the changes to the farm system have been viewed as positive, the lack of continuity and a failure to adopt the latest technology left them trying to catch up to other organizations.

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[T.G.]

Well that was enlightening and depressing at the same time.

[jsnpritchett]

Great article. I hope the Register continues to do more of this in-depth style of reporting and analysis. 

[Vlad27Trout27]

That was a sad read. Atleast Eppler left us with a good young rotation and Perry for improving these guys.   But no thanks to Dipito and his Roberto signing

[DMVol]

Withdrawing from the Latin America market was a killer.....and we are still suffering from its effects....those guys would be late 20's, early 30's big leaguers  now....

[TempeAngel]

Great reporting by Jeff Fletcher.

Arte Moreno gets the biggest piece of the blame pie. Good riddance Arte.

[steveuk]

What is the reason Moreno "chose not to invest" in Latin America? Seems a no brainer?

[halonatic13]

1 hour ago, jsnpritchett said:

Great article. I hope the Register continues to do more of this in-depth style of reporting and analysis. 

Like REAL journalism?

[BTH]

1 hour ago, steveuk said:

What is the reason Moreno "chose not to invest" in Latin America? Seems a no brainer?

 

4 hours ago, AngelsWin.com said:

“As Arte starts to get more and more excited by the ideas of flashy free agent signings, from (Bartolo) Colon to (Vladimir) Guerrero and leading to everybody since, there was just a shift in spending behavior or how the money was allocated.”

 

Edited November 28, 2022 by Trendon

[ten ocho recon scout]

One of the things that baffled me for years is that we stopped bringing up Domicans and other Latinos. This was a franchise that seemed to almost specialize in that the previous decade (as the article mentioned). I have no idea how that happened.

And I like how it says Dipoto finally convinced Moreno to spend there, and we got Baldoquin.

Just gets worse and worse.

I imagine the new ownership will fix that. Its such a no brainer there's almost no way not to.

[TurboFan]

Very good article.

For any owner intent on building a continuously competitive organization, obviously drafting and developing talent is the foundation and the first priority, or should be. Duh! Smart teams draft and develop individuals who either replenish/raise the performance capabilities of the 40 man roster, or serve as trade chips to acquire fits. It is beyond belief that an owner with such an investment would come up with reasons to not maximize player development. I can’t believe it helps long term cash flow. The system is a goose that lays eggs. Let’s see, do I want gold ones? Settle for silver? How much can I save if we produce wooden eggs? Really? How much do I lose if my team perpetually sucks? 
 

I think Perry is doing a clever thing drafting so many pitchers. Some of these will staff the rotation going forward, some the relief corps, but more than that will be trade chips to acquire whatever position players are needed year by year. Trading for an ace on a long term contract is not only expensive as hell, but extremely risky due to injuries, inconsistent future performance, and other heartbreaks. Perry can trade prospects for proven veterans at any needed position. Many of these prospects never pan out. Young pitching prospects are always in strong demand, more so generally than position players. Every team needs young pitching prospects all the time, but not all need a second baseman, a lefty corner outfielder, or a DH. Rams GM Les Sneed seems to see the benefit of trading draft choices for proven talent. When the draft picks are executed, the other team receives a prospect, who may or may not pan out, but Les is collecting proven talent. In a similar way, Perry can let desirable pitching prospects fuel and fund both his future pitching needs and his talent acquired by trades. Such a plan would not be needed as much if the development system was healthy. But because of current disjunction, I think it could turn out brilliant while the system hopefully gets healed and healthy.

[Inside Pitch]

Best article on the Angels system in a long ass time.

[DCAngelsFan]

Why no mention of Bane's disastrous 2010 draft?  

Kinda just slid right over that - it kind of leaves the impression that he was a genius who was only let go over a personality clash.  

Anyway, it's clearly our lack of involvement in international scouting that destroyed our pipeline. 

Then Baldoquin - that was inexplicable - did Dipo confuse him with someone else?  Can anyone explain that move?  

No one was in on him - I got the idea that 29 other GM's went wtf?  Who?! 

His stats were crap in Cuba, no resume to speak of - he was a nothing there before he became a nothing here.

After that - how do we compare on development post-draft?  

 

 

[Angel Oracle]

2 hours ago, Trendon said:

 

 

That’s what happens when your owner made his fortune in advertising.

It’s all about the splashes.

Don’t ever wish for an advertising guy to own your MLB team.

Edited November 28, 2022 by Angel Oracle

[Justin]

Thank you. Outstanding article. 

[Angel Oracle]

5 minutes ago, DCAngelsFan said:

Why no mention of Bane's disastrous 2010 draft?  

Kinda just slid right over that - it kind of leaves the impression that he was a genius who was only let go over a personality clash.  

Anyway, it's clearly our lack of involvement in international scouting that destroyed our pipeline. 

Then Baldoquin - that was inexplicable - did Dipo confuse him with someone else?  Can anyone explain that move?  

No one was in on him - I got the idea that 29 other GM's went wtf?  Who?! 

His stats were crap in Cuba, no resume to speak of - he was a nothing there before he became a nothing here.

After that - how do we compare on development post-draft?  

 

 

It sounds like J. Pierrepont Reagins forced Bane to double down on the high risk draft picks in 2010, when a balance of college picks and HS picks may have been best for having 5 picks in the first 40.

Clarke and Bolden never even got close to the majors, Lindsey only had a brief cup of coffee, Cowart did a little bit more but not much, and the one guy who stuck was an up and down reliever who struggled to stay healthy (Badrock).

Worst draft in franchise history?   At least they got Calhoun later on.

[BTH]

9 minutes ago, DCAngelsFan said:

Then Baldoquin - that was inexplicable - did Dipo confuse him with someone else?  Can anyone explain that move?  

No one was in on him - I got the idea that 29 other GM's went wtf?  Who?! 

His stats were crap in Cuba, no resume to speak of - he was a nothing there before he became a nothing here.

and there was that Chris Iannetta quote about how atrocious his BP was.

We'll probably never know since Dipoto isn't gonna publicly belittle a player, so long as he's a PBO.

[Angel Oracle]

3 minutes ago, Trendon said:

and there was that Chris Iannetta quote about how atrocious his BP was.

We'll probably never know since Dipoto isn't gonna publicly belittle a player, so long as he's a PBO.

Worst foreign player signing in MLB history?

Dude never got beyond AA ball by the time the Halos released him, for $16 million including penalties and losing out on Vlad Jr.   Only in 2022 did he finally reach AAA at age 28 in another org, while barely hitting .600 OPS between AA and AAA.

Edited November 28, 2022 by Angel Oracle

[AngelsMetsWS]

5 hours ago, steveuk said:

What is the reason Moreno "chose not to invest" in Latin America? Seems a no brainer?

Sounds like he got gunshy after the guy was caught skimming money. 

[Jeff Fletcher]

4 hours ago, DCAngelsFan said:

After that - how do we compare on development post-draft?  

Tune in tomorrow

[Angelsjunky]

Yeah, that was a good one. 

I remember for a few years, starting maybe five-ish years ago, the prospect pundits here (no names will be mentioned) kept saying that there was sneaky talent in the low minors. Yet almost all of it inevitably disappointed: Adell, Marsh, Adams, Jackson, Maitan, Knowles and Deveaux, Rivera and Holmes, and all the other "pundit darlings" like Kochanowicz and Nonie Williams that, as a whole, have disappointed. Some of these guys may still become good players, but what is so disheartening is how weighted they are, as a group, towards be less than even reasonably hoped.

I just skimmed through the Dipoto and Minasian drafts and boy is it depressing. Only a few guys became good players...Fletcher and Ward stand out, but far more disappointments and/or stalled careers. The early Dipoto years (2012-14) were especially bad

Minasian seems to combine elements of Dipoto's "high floor" and Eppler's "risk/reward" drafting, but seems to be doing it a bit more smartly. But it is still early to really judge his drafting, but the guys he drafts actually seem to do fairly well in the minors--at least for the most part.

[Warfarin]

7 hours ago, Angelsjunky said:

Yeah, that was a good one. 

I remember for a few years, starting maybe five-ish years ago, the prospect pundits here (no names will be mentioned) kept saying that there was sneaky talent in the low minors. Yet almost all of it inevitably disappointed: Adell, Marsh, Adams, Jackson, Maitan, Knowles and Deveaux, Rivera and Holmes, and all the other "pundit darlings" like Kochanowicz and Nonie Williams that, as a whole, have disappointed. Some of these guys may still become good players, but what is so disheartening is how weighted they are, as a group, towards be less than even reasonably hoped.

I just skimmed through the Dipoto and Minasian drafts and boy is it depressing. Only a few guys became good players...Fletcher and Ward stand out, but far more disappointments and/or stalled careers. The early Dipoto years (2012-14) were especially bad

Minasian seems to combine elements of Dipoto's "high floor" and Eppler's "risk/reward" drafting, but seems to be doing it a bit more smartly. But it is still early to really judge his drafting, but the guys he drafts actually seem to do fairly well in the minors--at least for the most part.

Yeah.  Time will tell, but Minasian seems to have built a draft/development team by plucking guys from teams that are notably very strong at doing so.  It is too early to tell, but hopefully he put the right guys in place to actually develop talent that can help this team finally get back to the playoffs.

This aspect of the team is how Minasian will make or break his time here.  IMO, the two most important things a GM can do:

1.  Build a strong farm system that pumps out young talent on a consistent basis - this is the backbone of most very good teams

2.  Avoid catastrophic player signings that cripple a team financially

He has done the second one so far.  I would say within 2 years, we'll have a solid idea of how good he is at #1.

[steveuk]

21 hours ago, Trendon said:

 

 

Sure, that explains 'what' happened but not really 'why'. Ok, with the power of hindsight, but it just seems such a dumbass decision?

Edited November 29, 2022 by steveuk
emphasis on 'what'

[BTH]

2 hours ago, steveuk said:

Sure, that explains 'what' happened but not really 'why'. Ok, with the power of hindsight, but it just seems such a dumbass decision?

It seems like the “why” is the same as the “what”— Arte decided to allocate resources towards star players instead of infrastructure and development processes like international spending.

As mentioned by others in this thread, Arte’s marketing background likely has to do with that since it’s easier for him to market a star MLB player then a 16 year-old international signing.

[ten ocho recon scout]

38 minutes ago, Trendon said:

It seems like the “why” is the same as the “what”— Arte decided to allocate resources towards star players instead of infrastructure and development processes like international spending.

As mentioned by others in this thread, Arte’s marketing background likely has to do with that since it’s easier for him to market a star MLB player then a 16 year-old international signing.

I think too that once the bad idea was implemented, the team sort of had to double down on it out of desperation. 

Essentially, Pujols was supposed to bring back the good times. And to be fair in 2012, the team was close. (Best team in baseball when Trout came up).

Now it was almost bad luck. You committed so much to pujols, essentially baseballs best player, and you're gifted Mike Trout, almost out of nowhere.

So you double down with Hamilton... which should have been amazing. But it's the exact opposite.

Suddenly you have to salvage a super expensive team with Mike Trout on it... with no farm help in site. Spending was almost the only option. And we spent poorly.

Like a snake eating it's own asshole