Bringing in your best relief pitcher

[Oz27]

3 hours ago, Blarg said:

Ignoring this season, it was a bust and we had no healthy bullpen arms but if you look back at 2015 Street entered the game 62 times. The Angels pitchers only had 2 complete games. That leaves 98 games where Huston Street did not close out the game or come in the 8th to stop the bleeding.

So, OZ, please explain how you set up this bullpen where you are going to put Street, or any other "best pitcher" to be there for all of those high leverage innings and how do you finish the game? The fact remains most bullpen pitchers max out at about 65-70 innings per year. Which games do you burn those inning up with? There are more than 65-70 high leverage innings played per year.

The Angels don't have a bullpen of Miller, Otero, Allen, Shaw, and a bunch of young studs in the minors to shut down and opponent any given inning, so, what is your plan?

I've explained what I think, repeatedly, and you don't want to agree with it. That is fine, of course. But there are only so many times and ways I can explain it. You win a game by getting 27 outs while giving up fewer runs than your opponent and for whatever reason outs 25 through 27 have been given a higher priority over time than outs 22 through 24, even though they all count the same. Sometimes the best use for your best reliever is the final three outs, but sometimes it isn't. If a team's three best hitters are due up in the eighth, with a narrow lead, I want my best reliever coming in for that situation. If the bases are loaded with one out in the seventh and a two-run lead, why the hell would you hold your best relief pitcher back for the ninth inning to protect a lead that may well not exist by that point? Your best reliever should pitch the most important situations and there are many occasions where that isn't the ninth inning.

As for "how you finish a game", you use your next best available reliever to do it. If that is a pitcher who has been good at pitching the seventh or eighth inning under a traditional bullpen setup, there is absolutely no reason they can't pitch the ninth.

[m0nkey]

7 minutes ago, Oz27 said:

I've explained what I think, repeatedly, and you don't want to agree with it. That is fine, of course. But there are only so many times and ways I can explain it. You win a game by getting 27 outs while giving up fewer runs than your opponent and for whatever reason outs 25 through 27 have been given a higher priority over time than outs 22 through 24, even though they all count the same. Sometimes the best use for your best reliever is the final three outs, but sometimes it isn't. If a team's three best hitters are due up in the eighth, with a narrow lead, I want my best reliever coming in for that situation. If the bases are loaded with one out in the seventh and a two-run lead, why the hell would you hold your best relief pitcher back for the ninth inning to protect a lead that may well not exist by that point? Your best reliever should pitch the most important situations and there are many occasions where that isn't the ninth inning.

As for "how you finish a game", you use your next best available reliever to do it. If that is a pitcher who has been good at pitching the seventh or eighth inning under a traditional bullpen setup, there is absolutely no reason they can't pitch the ninth.

But it's been said that relievers are comfortable in defined roles, which is when they pitch their best.

[arch stanton]

The idea of what a closer is has changed a ton since I started watching baseball. In 1984, Guillermo Hernandez won the AL MVP pitching 140 inning over 80 games. In 1992, Eck won the MVP with 80 innings over 69 games. Mariano Rivera is called the greatest reliever ever. He pitched 107 innings in 1996 as a setiup man. Only once after that did he even reach 80 innings during the regular season. In the postseason he had 141 innings over 96 games and this was on teams that normally had stacked pens. Teams that don't have effective pens with relievers who can fill their roles don't tend to get very far during the season.

So the postseason philosophy today for the Indians and Dodgers, both having their starting staffs limited by injury, is to allow their stud relievers to make up those innings. The Cubs have the luxury of depth in both starters and situational relievers that the other two don't have.

 

[Angel Oracle]

Indians have Miller, Allen, Otero, and Shaw.

The Dogs have Jansen, and then ah, err, um....

We are seeing how having a deep pen can pay big dividends in October.   The 2002 Halos were a great example.

With Merritt's possible emergence, even if temporary, the Indians pen matches up real well in all ways with the Cubs' pen.

Assuming a Cubs NLCS title, and Salazar and Bauer being available, it will be a classic WS between truly the two best teams in MLB and both trying to end ridiculously long WS title droughts.   Could be a classic in many ways!

[SlappyUtilityMIF]

4 minutes ago, ANAHEIMBOB said:

The Oakland A's did it back in the 70's with Rollie Fingers. 

Gossage used to run 2 inning save situations... Well, that was well before Ron Davis showed up on the Yankees as his set-up guy~

[Blarg]

On 10/20/2016 at 2:45 PM, Oz27 said:

I've explained what I think, repeatedly, and you don't want to agree with it. That is fine, of course. But there are only so many times and ways I can explain it. You win a game by getting 27 outs while giving up fewer runs than your opponent and for whatever reason outs 25 through 27 have been given a higher priority over time than outs 22 through 24, even though they all count the same. Sometimes the best use for your best reliever is the final three outs, but sometimes it isn't. If a team's three best hitters are due up in the eighth, with a narrow lead, I want my best reliever coming in for that situation. If the bases are loaded with one out in the seventh and a two-run lead, why the hell would you hold your best relief pitcher back for the ninth inning to protect a lead that may well not exist by that point? Your best reliever should pitch the most important situations and there are many occasions where that isn't the ninth inning.

As for "how you finish a game", you use your next best available reliever to do it. If that is a pitcher who has been good at pitching the seventh or eighth inning under a traditional bullpen setup, there is absolutely no reason they can't pitch the ninth.

That is not a plan. That is not sustainable either. And your statement that a guy that pitches well in the 7th will execute the same in the 9th with the game on the line is Sabermetric horseshit. Numbers is are not an indication of mental make up. The psychology of closing the game is more important than the fastball. You just want to ignore that because you think you've revolutionized how to improve a bullpen. 

Once the minor leagues start providing robots you can interchange those parts all you want but until then you are straddling a very thin line between success and disaster. 

[Oz27]

17 minutes ago, Blarg said:

The psychology of closing the game is more important than the fastball.

Do you have any evidence to back up this ridiculous assertion?

[Blarg]

My assertion is far from ridiculous but so far you've provided nothing in the way of a blueprint as to how your genius plan of using your best relief pitcher early in the game would somehow change the complexion of the game and not have any negative returns as the game progresses to the end. As if put your best pitcher pitcher in situation and wins occur.

But here is a rebuttal to your assertion that psychology has no impact on player performance and we will select a known player from the Angels, Scott Shields. You cannot argue that he wasn't a highly successful relief pitcher in his prime years with the Angels, an absolute linchpin during the years when the Angels shortened games by shutting opponents down in the innings 7-9.

Shields career working the 7th inning resulted in the opponents BA .176, OPS  .556 and a tOPS of 74.

His stats for the 8th inning were not quite as sterling but still very good holding opponents to a BA .208, OPS .597 and tOPS 84.

Pitching the 9th BA .267, OPS .725 and tOPS 126. 

Same pitcher, same team, the difference in results changing as the game nears the end. Maybe you can find some other reason for the drop off but for me it is pretty simple, he was never as well suited for the closing role as he was as a setup man. Donnely was the opposite but never was really assigned the closer role as an Angel.

You want a guy with a long career history let's look at Darren Oliver. Absolute nails as an 8th inning guy with a career tOPS of 64 book ended by a 7th and 9th innings of 94 &91. Nothing to turn your nose up about but why is it he is most comfortable in the 8th inning? It's not as though pitching the 8th inning he would have avoided either high leverage or the middle of the order in 224 innings pitched.

I guess it is on you to prove that your theory will work. There is pitcher after pitcher that has folded in the 9th inning role and that is how you filter them out and end up with guys like Eckersley, Rivera, Hoffman, Smith, Rodriguez in that role while each year you see a guy that took on the closer role and lasted only a season or two like Frieri before flaming out.

It's more than just pitching talent, it has to be a lot about what's between the ears. Even baseball Prospectus has series of articles about the Psychology of the game from different perspectives.

http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=5931

 

[Oz27]

Firstly, I never said there would be no negative consequences of using your best reliever earlier. Of course there are. Practically everything humans do have both negative and positive consequences and it is about weighing those things up to make the best choice. Secondly, I cannot and have not definitively said that psychology has no impact. We certainly cannot measure it and there is no evidence to back up "closer mentality" arguments, but that doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. I suspect "closer mentality" (like clutch) isn't a real thing, but I do not know that for sure. What I do know is there is that closers pitch no worse in non-save situations than they do in save situations, which debunks a pretty big part of that theory.

Anyway, to your "evidence" ... which is just plucking out two pitchers and arbitrarily picking out two statistics to suit your argument. Darren Oliver was much better in save situations than he was in non-save situations. He was better in high leverage spots than mid or low leverage spots. You pointed to his ninth inning stats, but 122 of his 131 games finished came in non-save situations. How exactly does that prove he didn't have this alleged closer mentality? He didn't get many save chances for his career because there were always better pitchers than him on a team, due to the fact he was an okay but not great relief pitcher. Scot Shields, too, was much better in save situations than he was in non-save situations. His high and low leverage performance is practically identical. His 'late and close' performance was better than his overall career performance. But the reason he didn't get much work as a closer more is he pitched on a team which had a better reliever.

As for the last bit, pointing to a few good closers doesn't prove anything. They were all really freaking good pitchers with a brilliant ability to get hitters out, whichever inning it was. It certainly doesn't substantiate, in any way, your "psychology is more important than talent" nonsense.

Also, thanks for bringing up BP. They've produced quite a bit of evidence that is contrary to practically everything you have said.

" Inferior relievers are being put into situations that call for the best available option, all to serve a human failing (loss aversion) and the weird idea that all a "closer" is allowed to do is pitch in save situations. Managers (and fans) are making decisions based on their emotional state, and this is a time that calls for cold, calculating rationality. "

http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=20927

" imagine what baseball would be like if suddenly, everyone forgot that the save rule existed. There would still be a bunch of one-inning-and-done guys around and some of them would be a few standard deviations better than the mean. "

http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=28889

[Blarg]

On the  contrary, I'm pretty much laughing at Oz that thinks he has a solution but forgets he has a problem to solve first. How do you execute the plan? 

It's the old story of the mice getting together to see what they can do about the cat. It keeps sneaking up on them and killing them while they are foraging for food. A young mouse comes up with the idea that if the cat has a bell on it's collar, that would give the mice a warning the cat is nearby giving them to me to escape. The mice all roared with appreciation of this great idea except for one old mouse that simply asks, "Who puts the bell on the cat?" 

Oz has a great idea but no plan or framework to put it in place. But he is adamant he is right because of numbers. 

[totdprods]

So let's sign Chapman or Jansen and they can pitch the 9th (and some change if needed, as both have been used this way), Street bumps to 8th and gets stuck to a 'role' to keep him in since he prefers that, and Bedrosian can hop around as needed.

[Oz27]

7 hours ago, totdprods said:

So let's sign Chapman or Jansen and they can pitch the 9th (and some change if needed, as both have been used this way), Street bumps to 8th and gets stuck to a 'role' to keep him in since he prefers that, and Bedrosian can hop around as needed.

I'm surprised by all the assumptions that Street will be back to his best next year, or even just that he will be effective. I hope I'm wrong but he looks done.

[totdprods]

5 hours ago, Oz27 said:

I'm surprised by all the assumptions that Street will be back to his best next year, or even just that he will be effective. I hope I'm wrong but he looks done.

I don't think he will be back to his best, but I think he will be effective and much better than last year still. He's mentioned before that he was already kicking around retirement before he was traded to the Angels as he didn't feel the Padres were going to be competing, so I think last year once his injuries and some natural decline kicked in, coupled with the team's struggles, his passion waned and everything snowballed. I think he comes in next season healthy and pitches better with a fresh start.

[Oz27]

I love this piece by Sam Miller on ESPN on the Indians' use of Miller and Allen...

http://www.espn.com.au/mlb/story/_/id/17910977/cleveland-indians-closer-cody-allen-great-postseason

[Erstad Grit]

9th inning has a different component.  I recall the As and red Sox subscribing to the committee approach only to have it melt down. The only times I can recall it working is if a team has two dominant RP which is basically two closers. 

[Oz27]

2 hours ago, Erstad Grit said:

9th inning has a different component.  I recall the As and red Sox subscribing to the committee approach only to have it melt down. The only times I can recall it working is if a team has two dominant RP which is basically two closers. 

The quality of the relievers (as in they all sucked) was the biggest problem for Boston when they did it, not how those shitty pitchers were being used.

[Troll Daddy]

Pause for thought

 

[Stradling]

There really isn't any pause.  He even went on to say that it is his job to take the ball when given to him and to do his job.  Now I personally agree with him that he shouldn't have been given the ball for the 9th inning.  

[Oz27]

Oh this thread was fun. Never has the "old man yells at cloud" thing been more fitting.

[Docwaukee]

one thing I didn't see mentioned is that getting the last three outs is actually different that the other 24 by the sheer fact that the you are the last guy.  Obviously I am only talking about situations where the team has a lead.  But if you are pitching in a 'save' situation, you have no back up.  There likely isn't another capable reliever to come in after you should you get into trouble.  

If we are going to play the numbers, let's take a look at leverage charts.  Before that though, let's take a look at the odds of someone getting on base.  Even the best reliever allows an average of 1 base runner per inning.  

So let's bring in our best reliever in the top of the 7th to face a 1st and 2nd, 1 out situation.  Let's assume it's to face the middle of the opposing team's lineup.  the #'s 3 and 4 hitters.  Let's say you have a 1 run lead.  Leverage with 1 out is 3.6.  Leverage with 2 outs is 3.2.  The reliever succeeds but you don't want to wast bringing him in so you start him in the 8th with no on, no out.  Leverage of 2.2.  He's got a whip of one, so the #5 hitter gets on base.  Now the leverage is 3.4.  Do you take him out for a lesser player because he's already thrown his 1 inning?  Or do you leave him in?   Well, you've got 6, 7, 8 coming up so you should be fine right?  Maybe.  But that certainly depends on the quality of the next reliever.  Even if you keep your better guy in to face a 4th batter and he gets an out, now you've got a guy on 2nd and one out.  Leverage of 2.9.  Someone else is coming in at that point for sure.   They get the #7 and #8 guys out.  

So now it's the 9th.  You've got either your second or third best reliever in the game who has already pitched to two batters with your 2nd or 3rd best reliever available and you've got 9, 1, and 2 coming up.  Leverage to start the inning is 2.9 with no on, no out.  So let's say you relieve your 3rd best guy with your second best guy.  Now, once again, odds are that one of those batters is going to get on base.  If you get the #9 batter out, leverage drops to 2.2 for the next guy.  But if that guy get's on then you are facing the #2 and #3 batters with a leverage of 3.9 with your second or third best reliever, and maybe your fourth best reliever still in reserve in case another guy gets on.  If that second guy gets on in the 9th, your leverage jumps to somewhere between 5 and 6.  

My point is that leverage starts higher and escalates much more quickly in the 8th an 9th than it does in the 7th, and the odds are that the opposing lineup is going to turn over during those final 7-8 outs.  (on a mathematical basis, it absolutely will).  As a corollary, the top 20 relievers in terms of avg leverage were all 'closers'  

The only solution to this problem?  

Something I have been preaching for the 7 years.  Have at least 3 very high quality relievers on your team as well as two other guys who might not be great relievers but are really good when they have the platoon advantage ie both a situational lefty AND and situational righty.  

This scenario actually allows you to have one of those three be a closer if they are sensitive about their 'fixed role'.  The other two mix and match the 7th and 8th with your situational guys filling those 1-2 batter gaps should anyone get in trouble.  

Is this applicable for 2017?  Well, right now your best three relievers are Bedrosian, Bailey and Street.  The rest are the rest.  The best you could hope for is that Street comes back to form and Bailey/Bedrosian become capable high leverage guys to mix and match during the 7th and 8th.  Best case is that you are still one reliever short and you still don't have a lefty that can get out other lefties.  

[Vegas Halo Fan]

An example from this postseason illustrates how shuffling relievers really doesn't work over the long haul. In this year's World Series, Cubs manager Joe Maddon brought Aroldis Chapman in during the bottom of the seventh in Game 6. He was left in until he walked the first hitter in the top of the ninth. The Cubs had a five-run lead at the time. The following night, when the Cubs needed a win to secure their first world title in more than a century, Chapman was brought in during the bottom of the eighth to protect a three-run lead. Anyone watching the game could tell that he was clearly gassed from the outing the previous night, and neither his velocity nor his control were on point. He coughed up the lead and could easily have cost his team the World Series because his manager got "creative" and went outside the one thing that he was acquired from the Yankees to do: lock down tight games late.

[arch stanton]

In the big picture you like to have a couple who can help the starter get out of the 6th or 7th inning jams so they only have to be really adept and lefty or righty. Then you need 3 guys who can consistently get through a full inning without help. That would make you pretty formidable in the regular season. I think the Indians proved that even if you have Andrew Miller that's a lot of eggs to trust to one basket. You're better off if your entire roster is compiled with close games in mind and you have as few weak links as possible.

[ettin]

On 10/21/2016 at 10:25 PM, Blarg said:

My assertion is far from ridiculous but so far you've provided nothing in the way of a blueprint as to how your genius plan of using your best relief pitcher early in the game would somehow change the complexion of the game and not have any negative returns as the game progresses to the end. As if put your best pitcher pitcher in situation and wins occur.

But here is a rebuttal to your assertion that psychology has no impact on player performance and we will select a known player from the Angels, Scott Shields. You cannot argue that he wasn't a highly successful relief pitcher in his prime years with the Angels, an absolute linchpin during the years when the Angels shortened games by shutting opponents down in the innings 7-9.

Shields career working the 7th inning resulted in the opponents BA .176, OPS  .556 and a tOPS of 74.

His stats for the 8th inning were not quite as sterling but still very good holding opponents to a BA .208, OPS .597 and tOPS 84.

Pitching the 9th BA .267, OPS .725 and tOPS 126. 

Same pitcher, same team, the difference in results changing as the game nears the end. Maybe you can find some other reason for the drop off but for me it is pretty simple, he was never as well suited for the closing role as he was as a setup man. Donnely was the opposite but never was really assigned the closer role as an Angel.

You want a guy with a long career history let's look at Darren Oliver. Absolute nails as an 8th inning guy with a career tOPS of 64 book ended by a 7th and 9th innings of 94 &91. Nothing to turn your nose up about but why is it he is most comfortable in the 8th inning? It's not as though pitching the 8th inning he would have avoided either high leverage or the middle of the order in 224 innings pitched.

I guess it is on you to prove that your theory will work. There is pitcher after pitcher that has folded in the 9th inning role and that is how you filter them out and end up with guys like Eckersley, Rivera, Hoffman, Smith, Rodriguez in that role while each year you see a guy that took on the closer role and lasted only a season or two like Frieri before flaming out.

It's more than just pitching talent, it has to be a lot about what's between the ears. Even baseball Prospectus has series of articles about the Psychology of the game from different perspectives.

http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=5931

 

In extra innings he had a tOPS of 90 so we should be wary of sample size and making a statement that it got worse for him as the game neared the end.

[Troll Daddy]

"Ask any reliever and they'll tell you they appreciate knowing their role and exactly when they'll pitch. Guys like Miller, who are flexible enough to pitch at any point in the game, are very rare. Most are like Chapman and appreciate having a set role. Baseball players are creatures of habit, and when you don't know when you're going to enter a game, it disrupts your routine."

CBSsports

i believe this to be true

[Stradling]

Me too TD.  That being said I would like the game or the players to evolve, or more importantly I wish we had enough depth in the bullpen that we could mix and match better.  What we saw in the post season can't really happen over the course of a 162 game season, but it would be nice to see a closer come in and pitch the 8th and 9th of an important game a little more often.