Right, and then one of the first moves Arte made, as mentioned previously in the thread by Erstad Grit, was that he changed the name to LA, which still pisses people off.
I haven't been to a Raiders game yet. I had planned to go this season with my best friend who passed away unexpectedly last November. I am considering the Minnesota game, because he was a huge Vikings fan, and it is a given that we would have gone to that one.
Haha! Yeah, the Raiders are still underachieving.
Yeah, haven't been around much. Had to relocate geographically for longer than anticipated. But I'm doing well, man. Hope to be back on here much more often. Thanks for asking. Hope all is good with you and yours
2009-13 was a total clusterfuck for this organization, and everything--including the org's mediocrity since then--pretty much followed from the collapse of the team after 2009.
But it wasn't really the loss of Vlad that led to what followed, at least no more than symbolically. And remember, it wasn't just Vlad, but also Figgins and Lackey who left the team. The team lost their best hitter, best starter, and best overall player (at least in 2009).
But as has been said, it wasn't bad that the Angels didn't re-sign Vlad. He went from 0.5 WAR and 107 wRC+ for the Angels in 2009 to 1.1 and a 119 wRC+ in 2010. His replacement, Hideki Matsui, was actually a bit better: 126 wRC+ and 1.5 WAR.
But it wasn't just the departure of those three that saw the team tank: the lineup, in general, just sucked in 2010. Compare the top position players by WAR in each year:
2009: Figgins 6.6, Hunter 3.8, Aybar 3.8, Morales 3.7, Izturis 3.2, Abreu 2.7, Rivera 2.6, Kendrick 2.1, Napoli 2.1
2010: Hunter 3.2, Abreu 2.4, Napoli 2.1, Bourjos 1.8, Kendrick 1.7, Morales 1.6, Matsui 1.5, Aybar 1.2, Izturis 1.1
Meaning, the top four players in 2009 were all better than the best player in 2010, at least according to WAR.
Also, consider that they essentially replaced Figgins with a combination of Brandon Wood, Albert Callaspo, and Kevin Frandsen. That alone saw a massive WAR swing: Figgins' 6.6 was replaced with a cumulutive -2.3 from those three, a 9 WAR swing. Now Figgins probably wouldn't have repeated that--he certainly didn't for Seattle, losing his starting job by 2011. His collapse is a bit mysterious. But it does explain a lot of went wrong for the Angels in 2010.
Other factors include Morales infamous injury and an off year by Aybar.
And of course the team did bounce back somewhat in 2011, going from 80 wins in 2010 to 86 wins in 2011, with some really good seasons from Kendrick (5.4 WAR), Bourjos (4.3), Aybar (3.8), and Callaspo (3.6), although pretty weak after that. They also had one of the best 1-2 punches in the rotation they've ever had, with Haren and Weaver. But it wasn't enough to get them back to the playoffs and Arte got squirrelly.
Anyhow, what I think really happened in 2010 is a natural down-swing after a strong era. Players were aging out, and several prospects (Wood, Mathis, McPherson, Kotchman, Morales, and of course Adenhart) didn't perform as hoped to replace them.
What Arte did, in his desperation to remain relevant, strangely ignored Adrian Beltre and then, after (thankfully) missing out on Carl Crawford, pushed one disaster after another: the Vernon Wells trade before the 2011 season, the Pujols and Wilson contracts after that season, and then Josh Hamilton after 2012. In less than two years, he crippled the franchise for years to come, forever putting to bed the silly "But it's not my money!" notion.
What the Angels probably should have done is weather the natural down-turn, and remain focused on the farm. And most importantly: Not burden the franchise with multiple albatross contracts that saw the Angels spending the following:
2011: Wells 0.4 WAR ($26.2M)
2012: Wells 0.2 ($21M), Pujols 3.3 ($12M) = 3.5 WAR for $33M
2013: Wells 0.0 ($14M*), Pujols 2.7 ($16M), Hamilton 1.3 ($17M) = 4.0 WAR for $47M
2014: Wells 0.0 ($14M*), Pujols 1.6 ($23M) Hamilton 1.1 ($17M) = 2.7 WAR for $54M
2015: Pujols 0.8 ($24M), Hamilton 0.0 ($20.7M) = 0.8 WAR for $45M
2016: Pujols -0.2 ($25M), Hamilton 0.0 ($26.4M) = -0.2 WAR for $51M
2017: Pujols -2.0 ($26M), Hamilton 0.0 ($26.4M) = -2.0 WAR for $52M
*The Angels miraculously got the Yankees to pay down $13.9M of what the Angels owed Wells, so I just subtracted $7M from each year.
As you can see above, the Angels were spending more and more on these players, for less and less performance. By the time you get to 2017, they paid $52M for -2 WAR from Pujols.
The team also had a ton of just terrible luck with their young starters in the 2014-16 range, so after Haren and Santana left and Weaver's arm went all gumby, there was no one really to replace them. And of course that period was the height of their "superstar and scrubs" approach to the lineup: from 2005-20, only one position players other than Trout surpassed 4 WAR: Simmons in both 2018 and '19.
And of course they had another dud on their hands in Wells who, after performing well in 27 games in 2017, was rewarded with a nine-figure five-year contract, which has yielded one solid season, a 2.9 WAR in 2018. From 2019-21, he's produced -0.1 WAR for $59M (adjusted for 2020). But Arte made up by signing Anthony Rendon, right? Right?! (tbd).
I'm being typically long-winded, but there is something morbidly entertaining about revisiting the sordid last 12 years of Angels baseball. But there's room to be hopeful, if for no other reason that Pujols is gone and this is the last year of Upton being on the books. Yes, they're paying Trout and Rendon a mint, and both are on the wrong side of 30 and will inevitably start declining within the next few years (if they aren't already), but at least their outlook is a whole lot better than Hamilton's, Pujols', and Wells' were when the Angels signed them.
I hope.
This is the first thought that popped into my head after hearing the news. I can't take listening to Mota's marble mouth speech for 9 full innings every day.