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  1. There's been a lot of head-scratching at Perry Minasian's moves this offseason as he has eschewed multi-year deals and added minimal if any premier talent (depending upon how you consider Raisel Iglesias). Now while I don't like the Cobb trade (as the Angels could have found similar talent on the free agent market without giving up Jahmai Jones), I am starting to see a bigger picture that could explain his thinking. I'm not saying that I have definitive proof that this is what Minasian has in mind, but kind of like the hypothetical Planet X, there's lots of secondary evidence that supports my theory, even if the plan (or planet) hasn't been directly seen. After acquiring Jose Quintana and Alex Cobb, the Angels now have, along with Dylan Bundy and Andrew Heaney, four veteran starters who will be free agents after 2021. So too will be their new closer, Raisel Iglesias, as well as their two position player acquisitions, Dexter Fowler and Kurt Suzuki. Now consider the farm system. It has a lot of projectable, but largely unproven, talent. Of especial interest to the near future, the team has two very good outfielders in Jo Adell and Brandon Marsh who should be ready sometime this season, and two starters in Reid Detmers and Chris Rodriguez, who also have a chance of major league readiness; if not in 2021, then as possible starters in 2022. After those four, they have several starters who could either be #4-5 starters or solid relievers in Hector Yan, Aaron Hernandez, Oliver Ortega, Pack Naughton, etc, as well as a third stud outfielder in Jordyn Adams who could be ready sometime in 2022. The bulk of the rest of the talent is very inexperienced, but with some upside. In other words, Minasian has inherited a very interesting farm system, but also a very inexperienced one. Back to the central thesis (of which the farm system will support in a moment): What can we say about Perry's offseason moves? Well, one thing we can say that he's done is raise the floor on the team's performance. He hasn't turned what looked like an 85-win team a couple months ago into a 90 or 95 win team, but he has increased its likelihood that it will reach 85 wins (plus or minus), and perhaps slightly upped the chances of 90. But of relevance to my thesis, he's done it without adding future payroll considerations. As mentioned, Iglesias, Quintana, Cobb, Fowler, and Suzuki are only paid through 2021, joining Pujols, Bundy, and Heaney, and followed by Upton after 2022. So what is my thesis? Minasian is trying to both improve the team, but without adding long-term commitments. Why? Because he wants to take a year to assess the internal talent, so he can make choices that will positively impact the long-term health and strength of the organization. And he's doing so in a way that may actually add talent via trades. To illustrate, let me offer two possibilities for the 2021 season, from the perspective of where we might be at in July: One, more has gone right than wrong and the Angels are in contention. They keep their players, and maybe use excess minor league talent to improve the team for the stretch run. Two, the Angels are falling out of contention, or out all together. All of a sudden they have four veteran starters and a reliever that could bring in significant minor league talent. They can move aside veterans to give young players like Adell, Marsh, Detmers, etc, a shot. Meaning, Perry has made his various acquisitions with an eye for both minimizing long-term investments and/or, if the team is not in contention, possibly trading them. By July we should have the answers to some very important questions for the future: Can Shohei Ohtani be a pitcher, or should the Angels start thinking about him converting to hitting only? How close are Detmers and Rodriguez to being major leaguers? How good is Griffin Canning? Was Dylan Bundy's breakout in 2020 real? Who are Jaime Barria and Patrick Sandoval, really? Are either of Luis Rengifo or Franklin Barreto good enough to be regulars? Are Adell and/or Marsh ready for the Show? I get the frustration of yet another year of waiting. But given that this is Perry's first year, and the question marks surrounding the Angels farm system and many of their major leaguers, I think it is necessary and that it should pay huge dividends in 2022 and beyond. And who knows, with a weakened AL West, he might have done just enough for the Angels to at least be borderline contenders and, if not, they'll have some trade chips come late July.
    8 points
  2. St1ck

    SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19

    Update: he told me to shut up and get out of his room.
    7 points
  3. 6 points
  4. Lhalo

    AOC Thread

    AOC by three lengths down the stretch.
    5 points
  5. My thoughts on Syndergaard are this. The team he is on just offered a pitcher $100 million for 3 years and didn’t get him. If Noah is pitching anything close to what he is capable of coming back from surgery, I don’t see the Mets letting him go.
    5 points
  6. Guaranteed that fucking psycho bitch would actively support the distribution of some new opiate drug if a pharmaceutical gave her like a $500 vacuum cleaner.
    4 points
  7. Lots of folks are expressing concerns about the one-year deals, with the Angels top four--or at least, most experienced--starters all heading to free agency after this season. Maybe I'm more bullish on our pitching prospects, but it could be that the reason Minasian isn't signing multi-year deals is that he both doesn't want to commit long-term to less-than really good talent, and because he has some degree of faith in the pitching prospects. Here is what we have for 2021, with club-controlled starters in 2022: 2021: Bundy, Heaney, Quintana, Cobb, Canning, Ohtani; plus, Barria, Sandoval, Suarez, McNaughton, etc. 2022: Canning, Ohtani, Barria, Sandoval, Detmers, C Rodriguez; plus, Suarez, McNaughton, Ortega, Yan, Hernandez, etc. One would think that Minasian will re-sign at least one of the veterans, probably Bundy. As to when he does it, it is kind of a damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't scenario, because it is difficult to know for sure whether Bundy's gains in 2020 are legitimate. Bundy probably thinks so, so he won't accept a low-ball offer right now. But because we only have 11 starts to go on, Minasian might be hesitant to make him an offer he can't resist. However, if they wait, Bundy's asking price could go up; if he has another season like 2020 but over 30+ starts (say, <3.50 ERA, ~5 WAR), all of a sudden he becomes one of the most desirable free agents in next year's crop, and might earn something like 5/$90M or more. Right now they might be able to extend him for $5M less AAV, say 4/$56M or 5/$65M, which would either be a bargain if he keeps his gains, or an overpay if he reverts to being a #4 starter. But let's assume that they extend Bundy or, if not, a cheaper contract for Heaney or Quintana, or possible a trade or a free agent. Then you have the 2022 list above, plus a veteran starter. That could be a good rotation, with the potential to be very good by 2023. Canning will hopefully round into solid #3 form. Detmers has that potential, and Chris Rodriguez could be a legit #1-2 starter. Barria is probably a good #4 and I still think Sandoval could be at least that good, as could be Yan. I'm not even giving up on Jose Suarez, who is in a similar category in terms of talent, and Ortega looked really good in 2019. Packy will never wow anyone, but his pitchability makes him a nice emergency #5 to have around. Chances are some of these guys--especially Suarez, Hernandez, and Ortega--turn into relievers, but there's some solid talent that could nicely flesh out the back of a rotation. Meaning, in C-Rod and Ohtani, you've got two elite talents, although both with health concerns. In Detmers and Canning, you have two guys who should be good #3 starters, maybe even a tad better. In Barria, Sandoval, Suarez, Ortega, Yan, Hernandez, and Naughton, you have six guys who could be anything from #3-5 starters or good relievers. So while all of the questions around the Angels' younger pitchers almost certainly won't be answered in the affirmative, there's some depth there, and we should know a lot before season's end. Meaning, they'll have a better sense of what sort of rotation moves they might need to make. In other words, it makes perfect sense why Minasian wouldn't want to have a lot of multi-year pitching contracts, because he's got a bunch of young--and cheap--internal options to assess this year, and he won't know what he has to work with--and thus what he needs long-term--until deep into the season.
    3 points
  8. AJ, very salient points. I dont get the sense that he is punting 2021 as some have said but wisely making this an evaluation year all the while being able to take advantage of the upside of his assets in-season, with the likelihood that they will be still contending come trade deadline. And should significant injuries and/or key underperformances occur, he is a better position to divest pieces that are not in long term plans in order for the future. Also it buffers him from labor uncertainties that will surely come after this season. Our fanbase largely suffers from a fill in the blank_____ syndrome whereby it sees the present through the eyes of the past disappointments and abuses and has a hard time seeing that they are in a different situation (relationship) with a different person. The fact that Arte is the common denominator between past and present clouds the perception. We really dont know how much Arte is stepping back, but I get the sense that he didnt know exactly what he wanted in terms of changing the ways the front office worked when he hired Eppler; he wanted a more analytics driven view but didnt know how to create a balance. I believe that he is more comfortable with Minasians balanced approach and is giving him the wherewithal to build the organization within the structure of a certain budget and is giving him significant autonomy. Minasian has a window to show improvement, just as Eppler did, but contrary to the Facebook fans, that window is 3-4 years, not 2021. He is wise to not cut corners with evaluating and setting the foundation, and being conservative in year 1.
    3 points
  9. How do you figure? Davis hasn't done diddly the last two years. OPS+ of 83 -- Andrus hasn't hit either the last couple years but at least he can play SS still.. Unless Acker becomes something they are just trading contracts.
    3 points
  10. It seems that we always think this about the A's, yet they always find a way to play meaningful games in September.
    3 points
  11. Crampknees

    AOC Thread

    To be honest, when you state it as fact, I have to believe the opposite and she had to have been there. After all, you are wrong 98.7987% of the time.
    3 points
  12. I'm a more hopeful on Fowler than where I first started IF Maddon only plays him vs. RHP. His splits are actually pretty good as a LHed hitter so a platoon is certainly in order. I also didn't realize he only played half the games in 2020 which can be pretty tough to get things going if you start slow. The Cobb thing I'm just not going to agree with at any point I don't think until he does well somehow and I look like an idiot. Everything else he's done so far, I'm a fan of. Particularly the Quintana deal. I could see spending another 6-7 mil or so on a couple of pen pieces and calling it an off season. I was hoping for more but I think it'll put the team in position to win 88 games or so.
    3 points
  13. Wow, just read the article. @Dave Saltzer called me around 3pm today and said a bunch of the same things. An AW article is incoming. Sometime tomorrow on Bauer and the impact of MLB.
    3 points
  14. That scene was filmed down the block from my sister’s place on the stairs of the Montalban Theater on Vine. I laugh every time I walk by those stairs.
    3 points
  15. No joking, I’m thinking the 3 of us need to have a beers night in the next couple of weekends. I wanna see if I can get you two to kiss after like 5 IPAs. St1ck would have to lean down, obviously.
    3 points
  16. Lol. Ok. Trump is a self made man. My story? Okay. It was never easy for me. I was born a poor black child. I remember the days, sittin' on the porch with my family, singin' and dancin' down in Mississippi...
    3 points
  17. We missed ebola, but that was the hamilton year.... We lost that round
    3 points
  18. By David Saltzer, AngelsWin.com Senior Writer Quick! Let’s play a game. Which of these numbers is not like the other two: 40, 45, and 17. If you guessed 17, you’re a winner! If you also guessed that those numbers represent the reported annual salaries for Trevor Bauer is his pending 3-year deal with the Dodgers, you’d also be right. This deal is bad for baseball. It’s bad for baseball on many levels, and as such, if baseball had an effective commissioner, it should voided and reworked in the better interests of baseball. This isn’t sour grapes from a pitching-starved Angels fan. It’s the recognition that this contract was specifically designed by both sides to thwart the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Consider for a second that Bauer is getting paid more in 2021 than three other baseball club's entire projected payrolls. That is just insane! There are two main reasons why the reported Trevor Bauer deal is bad for baseball. The first is that it sets a ridiculously high bar for all future pitchers that will make pitching too expensive long-term for small and mid-market teams to develop and maintain a solid rotation long enough to develop a championship team. Most likely Trevor Bauer won’t pitch much more than 200 innings in either of the next two years. At $40 million and $45 million each year, Bauer is establishing the market for all future pitchers at nearly $200,000.00 per inning pitched. That’s nearly $67,000 per out! That is an insane amount—one that will tank small and mid-market teams and one that will have long term damage to the game. This, more than anything, shows why Major League Baseball needs an absolute floor and hard ceiling on team payroll. Large market teams will continue to drive up the prices for players, particularly pitchers, to the point where small and mid-market teams won’t be able to hold onto a rotation long enough to compete. With this new mark set, all future arbitration salaries will have a new target amount on what a starting pitcher should earn per out and the prices for frontline starting pitchers will shoot up dramatically. While the damage done by the precedent set in the Bauer deal will have long term consequences for the game—consequences that will hurt the game quite a bit—that isn’t the truly odious part of the deal. What is truly against the better interests of baseball is that after each and every year in the deal it is rumored that Trevor Bauer will have an opt-out option whereby he can choose to become a free agent again. That, along with how this contract is structured, is what is truly bad for baseball. How can Bauer’s opt-out options be bad for baseball when other contracts with opt-outs are not? Simple. It’s because those opt-out options were designed to cheat the game of its internal mechanism for self-regulation and spending constraint. Look at the numbers above: 40, 45, 17. Notice anything about them? The first two years pay comparable salaries. The third year only pays 37.78% of the second year. Worse yet, the final year of the contract only pays him 16.67% of the total deal. The fact that there is such a dramatic difference in the final year’s salary shows the real reason why the Dodgers and Bauer structured the contract the way in which they did. It isn’t because Bauer will suddenly become worth less money in that final year. It isn’t because he needs so much more money up front in order to feed his family. It’s because both sides agreed to thwart the Collective Bargaining Agreement. No one, with any shred of honesty, can say that they expect Trevor Bauer to fulfill this entire contract, as written, without opting out or renegotiating. It doesn’t even pass the laugh test. If Bauer pitches to the level to which he is being paid, he has every incentive to opt-out of the last year. He can’t lose on that deal! He can either re-approach the Dodgers for a negotiation, or take his chances on the open market, and he will get more than the remaining $17 million in his final year. The only way Trevor Bauer would not opt out of that deal, especially in his third year, is if he is hurt and needs to heal or reestablish himself. If he is truly hurt (and I would never want to see a player hurt), then he might stay for that final year while he recovers. But, if he pitches anywhere near the level that he is expected to play, then he will be able to command more money and more years after that second year opt-out. Heck, he might be able to command more money and more years after that first year opt-out! This is bad for baseball. So then why would the Dodgers and Trevor Bauer structure the deal that way? They did so in order to lower the Average Annual Value (AAV) of the contract to only $34 million dollars and to cheat the system. Had it only been a 2-year deal, the AAV for the deal would be $42.5 million, which not only is substantially more, but even more costly under the Luxury Tax established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Since the owners and players could never agree on a true ceiling for team payrolls, in order to try and control costs and to keep large markets from completely dominating the sport, the two sides agreed to try and control spending through the Luxury Tax. The Luxury Tax is based on the combined AAVs for all the players on the team. The more teams go over the Luxury Tax amount, and the more years the team is over the threshold, the higher the rate the team pays in Luxury Taxes. It does not matter what the club actually spends in that year on payroll—it only matters what the combined AAV is for the year. By signing Trevor Bauer, the Dodgers appear to be over the limit for this year and unless they make changes, will pay the Luxury Tax. Since this will be the first year that they are over the limit, they will pay a 20% surcharge on every dollar that they spend over the limit. Next year, the Dodgers are likely again to be over the limit and are likely to pay a 30% surcharge on every dollar. In the third year of the deal, if the Dodgers are again over the limit, they would pay a 50% surcharge on every dollar over the limit! So, now we know why the deal was most likely structured the way that it is rumored—to cheat the rest of baseball from the Luxury Tax. The difference between a $34 million AAV and a $42.5 million saves the Dodgers an additional $1.7 million in the first year of the contract, $2.55 million in the second year of the contract, and an additional $4.25 in the third year of the contract because they have a lower AAV when determining the dollar value of the contract for the Luxury Tax! That is potentially, $4.25 million saved over the first two years of the deal and up to $8.5 million saved if he stays for the third year! Since it is highly unlikely that he will stay for that third year, the Dodgers are still gaming the system to avoid the paying $4.25 million disincentives that were meant to keep them from dominating the free agent market. This is why the deal needs to be voided and reworked in the better interests of baseball. If teams can structure deals this way, and add an additional year and an opt-out at a ridiculously low salary, what’s to prevent a team from adding two years like that? If one year can lower an AAV by $8.5 million, how much more could the Dodgers have lowered the deal by adding two years at $17 million/year? If two years suddenly becomes tolerable for baseball, let’s try three years. Heck, why not ten years. Let’s drop the AAV for every player so that no team ever pays the Luxury Tax again. All of a sudden, that super expensive free agent who may put your team over the Luxury Tax limits won’t do so anymore. And the big market teams will be able spend with impunity and destroy the small and mid-market teams. If baseball had a real commissioner, one who truly cared about the better interests of the game, then s/he would implement a simple rule for gauging contracts with opt-outs. Let’s call it the 60/40/20 rule. This rule would be used universally to determine if a player and team is trying to game the Luxury Tax or not. Simply put, any contract that frontloads more than 60% of the money to the player before an opt-out, such that 40% or less remains after the opt-out, or any contract that drops the actual pay to the player by more than 20% in the year following an opt-out will be voided in the better interests of the game. This rule doesn’t prevent opt-outs, it just prevents teams from doing what the Dodgers just did. The first part of this rule would force the commissioner to look at how the money in a contract is divvied up before an after an opt-out. If there is more than a 60/40 split in the deal whereby the player earns more than 60% of the total money before the opt-out, then on its face, the deal appears to be meant to get the player on a lower AAV and thwart the Luxury Tax. A contract like that be immediately voided as being against the better interests of baseball. The second part of the rule, the 20 clause, is to force the commissioner to look at every year in a contract that has multiple opt-outs. If a deal has multiple opt-outs, and the players salary drops by more than 20% in the year following an opt-out, it again should be voided as being against the better interests of baseball. Again, such a drop should immediately signal that the team is counting on the player to opt-out and only added the following years to lower the AAV. Backloaded contracts with opt-outs aren’t the problem: as players get older, they are more likely not to opt-out of guaranteed money as they are less likely get as much money and as many years. It’s the nature of the aging process and decline in production. So, if a deal is structured such that it pays more at the end of the contract, that’s not so much of a problem. Backloaded contracts don’t hurt against the Luxury Tax because in the years the player played under that contract, the AAV was higher than his actual salary. If anything, a backloaded contract may cause a team to go over the Luxury Tax and pay it, even if the actual payroll wasn’t above the threshold. This is easy to see with a current contract. While there has been much speculation about Nolan Arenado opting-out of his remaining money, it is very unlikely that he would do so. It is very unlikely, even after his trade to St. Louis, that he would walk away from all the money remaining on his contract. So, the deal was most likely not structured to cheat the system. But, frontloaded contracts with opt-outs are the problem. If Bauer’s deal is allowed to go through as rumored, then there is nothing to stop teams from adding many more years to a deal at a dramatically lower salary with an opt-out just to lower the AAV. Both the teams, and the players will know that neither side intends to stay past the opt-out, and the Luxury Tax will be cheated. Look, I’m all in favor of opt-outs. If a player wants to structure a deal to include an opt-out in it, and the team is willing to do so in order to sign the player, then it is a fair topic of negotiation. There are many legitimate reasons why a player would want an opt-out, just as there are many legitimate reasons why a player might want a partial or full no-trade clause. If a team is willing to include those in a deal, it should be allowed to do so, as long at it is not designed to cheat the system. What I am not in favor of, is exactly what’s happening here with the rumored Bauer deal. The team is trying to thwart paying millions in the Luxury Tax. They want to claim a deal that really has an AAV of $42.5 million only has an AAV of $34 million. I don’t blame their front office for trying this trick; I do blame the commissioner for not seeing through it and forcing the contract to be restructured. In the past, several teams, including the Angels, tried creatively cheat the system with “personal services” clauses (whereby a team pays the player for consulting services for years after playing) and “milestone accomplishments” clauses (where the team retains the rights to market historic on-the-field accomplishments). Both types of clauses were designed to funnel more money to the player without raising the AAV of the contracts. In both cases, both the owners and the players union agreed to ban those types of clauses because they were rightly seen as ways to thwart the system. So, the precedent for banning aspects of a contract are there—now all the fans need is a commissioner who would enforce it and start with the Bauer deal. If Trevor Bauer reads this, I’m sure he’d say that he fully intends fulfill every year and every part of his contract. I’m willing to put up $100 that says that if he’s healthy, he will opt-out or renegotiate the deal at some point before the contract is over. I truly doubt, though, that he, or anyone would take that bet because it is too obvious that he will opt-out. That's the whole point of this contract—it's to get him to opt-out of that final year. As long as Major League Baseball maintains the Luxury Tax, and does not impose a hard floor and ceiling on salary, the commissioner should adopt a 60/40/20 rule for evaluating contracts. And, looking at the Bauer deal, it should be immediately voided and reworked, as it is clearly not in the better interests of baseball just like the personal services clauses and milestone accomplishment clauses were not in the better interests of the game. View the full article
    2 points
  19. I don't see what the issue is here. The Dodgers did nothing against the rules. Bauer did nothing against the rules. Those teams with lower payroll are doing that by choice. Since there is no minimum payroll, those owners are also doing nothing wrong in terms of the bargaining agreement. Since baseball plays the most games out of any sport, it's never going to be like other sports in terms of contracts and all the other things comparatively. Oh and I can guarantee Angelswin would not have written an article had the Angels signed Bauer to this same contract.
    2 points
  20. 2 points
  21. Hard part about walking into the job after 2020 was that Perry had no chance to evaluate our talent. We’ve been hoping he trades for SP, but Perry doesn’t even know what he has yet. What if Adams turns into a Top 100 guy this year? What if Marsh wins the job in Spring? What if Detmers is good enough to pitch in 3 months? So many unknowns. Perry seems to be stabilizing this year’s team as much as possible, keeping flexibility to evaluate and adjust going forward.
    2 points
  22. I think Victor will eventually be a MLB GM on some team, but I don't think he's ready at this time with little to no experience. Maybe down the road he will, but I don't think we'll be kicking ourselves anytime soon for not hiring Rojas as our GM straight from the booth to the front office.
    2 points
  23. I feel like Minasian has helped highlight the difference between going in on 2021 and going ALL in on 2021. It's a slight, but powerful delineation. Going all in on 2021 means budget and prospects be damned. We're going to get the best players in baseball and win in 2021-2023. After that, we may go through a rebuild on 2024-2026, before being competitive again in 2027-2030. It's a very Dombrowski way of operating. Minasian went in on 2021, building a team that has a better shot at competing than any Eppler team outside of the 2018 team, which looked REALLY good before injuries set in. It's pretty much a guarantee that they won't be a bad team. We'll have to see how good they actually are. But the fundamental difference is the financial clout they'll wield after 2021, and the prospects that Eppler worked so hard to bring in and develop will be ready after 2021. Which means this club will likely be competitive in 2022, and one of the elite teams in baseball in 2023 to 2026, and still competitive again 2027-2029.
    2 points
  24. Well because he’s awful. I know you might have been too young to notice but Physioc was just bad and boring. The difference between him and Victor would be like the difference between Chick Hearn and the Bill McDonald doing the games for the Lakers. That’s how bad Physioc was.
    2 points
  25. failos

    In 2014....

    Obligatory:
    2 points
  26. Wow that was a surprisingly harsh, but good article.
    2 points
  27. I'm hoping for a shootout and it comes down to who has the last posession.
    2 points
  28. We Kings/Angels fans know the meaning of longsuffering. Here's hoping that Minasian can do what Dean Lombardi did, transform the culture and build the foundation for a championship through the draft; spending more but not before they are on the cusp. Who knows who the Angels Justin Williams/Mike Richards will be?
    2 points
  29. As much as I like Gonsolin, we aren't getting him. We can't, even if the Dodgers were willing to trade him, which I doubt they are. You don't trade a guy like that with 6 years of control. May is kinda in the same boat. 5 years of control. It's a pipe dream, unfortunately.
    2 points
  30. totdprods

    In 2014....

    Quintana made 32 starts and posted a 3.32 ERA in 200 innings. When was the last time an Angels pitcher threw 200 innings?
    2 points
  31. Yeah, it was pretty strong. Kinda liked it. That, coupled with the 2/$85M silliness, makes me glad he's not an Angel.
    2 points
  32. Wow I've never seen FanGraphs go after a player like that. Then again, there aren't many players like Bauer.
    2 points
  33. I also didn't inherit hundreds of millions of dollars from my father and file for bankruptcy multiple times.
    2 points
  34. 2 points
  35. Semien could be the best name for immature jokes at SS since the dick schofield days.
    2 points
  36. I doubt that. He did have a hat giveaway posted on his website
    2 points
  37. Sorry, I thought you were writing coherent thoughts. carry on.
    2 points
  38. And he did it without a "real" agent.
    2 points
  39. UCLA girls are quite hygiene conscious.
    2 points
  40. Dexter Fowler is thanking Bauer for removing him from the AW hotseat.
    2 points
  41. First, I dispute your premise: I don't think they were a below .500 team last season over 162 games. They started poorly and never caught back up. Small sample size skewed their record. Obviously can't know for sure, but they were trending up near the end. They had sorted out the bad apples that were dragging them down and were starting to fire up a bit. That's not to say they were a great team last year or would necessarily have made the playoffs, but I believe in 162 they were an above .500 team last year. Second, I do think they were improved this offseason. RF, closer, SP5, and SS were all a problem last season. Iglesias stabilizes SS which also improves 2B. The others really couldn't be worse than last year. My expectation is RF is about the same as last year, maybe slightly better. I think the rotation noticeably improves. Closer should also be better, which will help the pen (still have a hunch they may be adding another good arm in the pen). The guys no longer here were largely ones who needed to go (<cough> Teheran). Difficulty is projecting who will do better or worse of those still here. E.g. Walsh almost certainly can't duplicate his late 2020, but it isn't impossible to believe he could be a solid 1B for a season. We'll need to wait and see. Ditto Stassi at the plate. Upton started off as crap and finished much better. Ohtani? Who knows. Can't be worse, though. Bundy? Again, difficult to be sure. tl;dr I think we were most likely a 84-85 win team if we played 162 last year. I think we might be upper 80's this season, which in this division might put us in the playoff conversation. A deadline move could put us over the top.
    2 points
  42. Personally, I doubt the Dodgers trade David Price though. The Dodgers don't trade away surplus value, they hoard it, even to the point of putting top prospects in AAA when they clearly don't belong there. They'll stash Tony Gonsolin in AAA just like they have with Gavin Lux even though he hitt .392 there. Gonsolin put up a 2.31 ERA last season, and 2.93 the season before and still has one minor league option remaining. But it's pretty effed up. Most teams won't do that because it crosses an imaginary moral line. When a player is ready they promote them, and if they can't, they'll trade them because it isn't right to hold a player back like that. The Dodgers however, have no qualms with it because it makes them better. The Yankees do it too, but to a lesser extent.
    2 points
  43. Second Base

    Next years SS

    I'd go with none of the above. With Paris, Vera, and Jackson in the system, whoever they bring in, only needs to here for probably 2-3 years. All those options you listed will require longer contracts that are out of the Angels price range. Iglesias has hit .288 and .373 the last two years and is a good defender at shortstop. If he's solid in 2021, sign him to a 2 year extension. Otherwise, the Angels have done internal candidates that everyone is overlooking. First, Franklin Barreto is a former top 50 prospect and is only 25. He's entering his physical prime and I wouldn't rule out a breakout performance from him in 2021. Luis Rengifo had been good at every single stop in the minors since the Angels acquired him. Last year was a lost year, and he's likely to tear it up in AAA in 2021. He's got the OBP and wheels to dream on me and is only 24. He's going to be a starting infielder in the majors in 2022 and beyond. If it isn't with the Angels then it'll be elsewhere. And Robel Garcia has power, youth and talent in his corner. We'll see if he can put it together. So my answer is to fill the position internally.
    2 points
  44. Angelsjunky

    Next years SS

    All joking aside, if he's pretty good in 2021, I could see them extending him for 2-3 years as a placeholder for Paris or Jackson. Or if Rengifo finally plays well, he could be the starting SS in 2022.
    2 points
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